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Hoeffel & Singer

ELECTIONS, POWER, AND LOCAL CONTROL:
REINING IN CHIEF PROSECUTORS AND SHERIFFS
Janet C. Hoeffel
Stephen I. Singer
Our problem of mass incarceration, and perhaps more
importantly, the barriers to changing it is, at least in significant part,
tied to the manner in which key actors in our criminal justice system
are selected in relation to other political actors. More specifically,
there are two problems with the election of local chief prosecutors and
sheriffs that contribute to the problem of mass incarceration and act as
a barrier to reform. First, prosecutors and sheriffs have an extremely
narrow, single-minded focus – crime control and suppression. Second,
unlike other elected government officials with much broader
responsibility–such as mayors, city councilmembers, governors, and
state legislators–local chief prosecutors and sheriffs are not term
limited and often run unopposed. Chief prosecutors and sheriffs
frequently remain in office for an entire generation or more. This
toxic combination of narrow focus and disproportionate power skews
our political system in the direction that secures and increases the
power of chief prosecutors and sheriffs. And the primary thing that
this does, either directly or indirectly, is mass incarceration. In this
paper, we argue that the historical goals causing the move from
appointed chief prosecutors and sheriffs to elected ones have not been
realized because of these distortions. In fact, because times and
government have changed, these goals are now better realized and
managed by moving back to a system of appointments, allowing
citizens to retain local control over criminal justice through more
responsive and balanced elected local officials.
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I. THE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR ELECTING PROSECUTORS AND
SHERIFFS
The states’ primary impetuses for the move from appointed
chief prosecutors and sheriffs to elected ones was the desire for more
local input and control and for increased democratization of American
government by giving citizens input through elections of officials.1
During this period, citizens became dissatisfied with a remote central
state government appointing local officials such as prosecutors and
sheriffs, which often resulted in appointments simply being the spoils
of electoral victory at the state level, i.e., a patronage system.2
In addition, the appointment of state officials to run local
governments was inevitable for the vast majority of the country. By
far, the most well developed governmental structures existed at the
level of state government. Most of the country lived in rural areas and
small towns with local governments that were fairly rudimentary in
their development. Therefore, except for perhaps in the few large
cities, the only real option for the vast majority of the country was
appointment by state level officials who did not come from the area
nor represent their local interests. Therefore, when the citizenry
became dissatisfied with the patronage system that had developed over
the appointment of local officials such as judges and chief prosecutors,
it was inevitable that it turned to local elections. Because government
at the local level was, as a general matter, rudimentary and
inconsistent, the natural solution, really the only option, was local
elections.3

1

Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528
(2012). As described by Michael Ellis, it is no coincidence that this change came at
the same time when American government became more democratic. Id. at 1530.
State constitutional conventions adopted measures to “enlarge voting franchises,
reapportion legislatures, and make many more government offices, including
governors and judges, elected.” Id.
2
Id.
3
Today, local chief prosecutors are elected in all states but five. See Ronald F.
Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598 (2014) [hereinafter
Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections]. In Alaska, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
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II. THE SINGULAR INSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE ELECTED
PROSECUTOR AND SHERIFF
The quintessential elected officials are the chief of the
executive branch and the legislative branch. At the local level this
usually means a mayor and city council or their equivalent. Mayors
and city councils are typically responsible for providing a broad array
of services to the local citizenry. These services include police,
firefighters, streets, water, lighting, other utilities, sanitation, parking,
health, housing, and parks and recreation. Because of this wide range
of responsibilities, a mayor and city council cannot put too much
money into any one area. Rather, a mayor and city council must
develop a ranking of services in order of priority and allocate limited
resources accordingly. Moreover, the relative ranking of various
services must correlate fairly well with that of the local citizens or the
elected officials risk being voted out of office.
Local chief prosecutors and sheriffs, however, do not have this
breadth of responsibility. They are law enforcement officials with a
singular responsibility–crime suppression and control. Their job
performance, to the extent it is evaluated at all, is based solely on how
local citizens feel they are doing in terms of dealing with one issue–
crime. Therefore, for the chief prosecutor and sheriff, the more money
spent prosecuting crime and punishing criminals the better. Unlike the
mayor or city council, they do not need to weigh the costs and benefits
of prosecuting and punishing crime against any other community
needs such as streets, water, lighting, sanitation, housing, health, or
parks and recreation.
Another weight on the scales of power is the vested interests
their offices garner. Local prosecutors’ and sheriffs’ offices function
much like any other government bureaucracy. The bigger they get and
the more resources they command, the more powerful they are and the
Delaware and New Jersey, a statewide elected official appoints the local chief
prosecutors. Id. at 598–99.
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better positioned they are to command more and more resources. For
example, the bigger the office, the more people it employs. The more
employees the office has, the more voters it touches through the
employee, the employee’s family and friends, and their families and
friends. In addition, and this is particularly true of sheriffs running
local jails, the bigger the jail or the office, the larger the contracts the
office has to give out. These valuable contracts for food, laundry,
plumbing, electrical, and the like further create vested interests that
seek to protect and enlarge the status quo.4
One might believe that a mayor has vastly more of this kind of
power than a mere sheriff or district attorney given the broad array of
responsibilities and the multitude of employees and facilities under his
or her purview. But such is not the case. Most city employees,
beyond the mayor’s and city councilmembers’ personal staffs, are
covered by civil service rules that bar political activities and protect
against political retaliation. Many of the larger departments such as
police, fire, and sanitation may be staffed by union workers protected
by collective bargaining arrangements. Further, local government
contracts are usually covered by competitive bidding rules and
regulations that greatly limit discretionary authority.
On the other hand, the same is often not true for sheriffs’ and
particularly prosecutors’ offices. In many places, especially in the
South where incarceration rates are higher, employees of these offices
are exempted from civil service. This means that they are “at will”
employees who may be hired and fired for any reason or no reason at
all. This also means that not only are employees and their families and
friends a direct source of votes, but they may provide labor for the
campaigns of the head of the office for whom they work and for
4

A study by the Vera Institute of Justice showed that 74% of a typical jail’s costs is
employee costs, such as for benefits and health care, and the number of employees
is, of course, driven by the number of inmates and the size of the jail. VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF JAILS: MEASURING THE TAXPAYER COST OF
LOCAL INCARCERATION 10 (2015),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-jails.pdf.
Sheriffs have every incentive to grow the size of their population and their facilities.
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political allies or future allies of the sheriff or chief prosecutor. Once
again, bigger is definitely better.
And while some of the same may be said for the bureaucracy
under a mayor and city council, even if not to quite the same extent
due to civil service rules, because the broad array of responsibilities
conspires to limit their power. Thus, while a health department creates
a vested interest in resources going to the health department, this is
balanced by competition from the sanitation department, the fire
department, and the police department, etc. The same is not true for
prosecutors’ and sheriffs’ offices with their narrow, single-minded
focus on crime. All of the pressure is in the same one direction –
towards more and more resources for prosecution and punishment of
crime.
III. THE ELECTORAL FORCES CREATING INTERMINABLE POSITIONS OF
POWER
The election process itself utterly fails to ensure local control
by the citizenry. Control remains firmly in the hands of the chief
prosecutor and sheriff. Voters have very little to do or say about
prosecutors’ and sheriffs’ elections. Unlike sitting mayors, governors,
and state and local legislators, the vast majority of incumbent
prosecutors and sheriffs run unopposed.5 The unopposed chief local
prosecutor and sheriff need offer little, if any, information or
accountability to voters during an election. Additionally, regardless of
whether he is opposed or unopposed, the incumbent prosecutor and
5

To ensure they retain this unchecked power over the criminal justice system, chief
prosecutors have their own war chests, and to remain ingratiated with this allpowerful dispenser of mercy and favors, lawyers contribute heavily to the incumbent
to ensure they will be treated well by the District Attorney. See Jeff Morganteen,
“The DA Who’s Staying Put With the Help of Generous Donors,” (Sept. 12,2013),
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/09/12/vance/. There are many examples, but
Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance provides one ready example of the excess.
After Robert Morgenthau retired at age 89, having served for nearly 35 years in the
position, Vance was elected in 2009. Id. In order to ensure his victory in 2013, he
began an aggressive fundraising campaign; his campaign treasury held a $1.6 million
balance as of July 2013. Id. Of course, no opponent emerged.
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sheriff wins the vast majority of the time.6 And, even when there is
opposition, the voters neither hear nor demand more than statements
about personal experience and character or platitudes indicating the
candidate is “tough on crime.” Voters neither hear about nor demand
information about the incumbent prosecutor’s office policies, whether
on plea bargaining or charging, or about the cost to the taxpayer of
overcharging and mass incarceration of arrestees and nonviolent
offenders.7
To distort the process further, unlike sitting mayors, governors,
and state and local legislators, incumbent prosecutors and sheriffs do
not have term limits.8 Although term limits never garnered sufficient
support to become law at the federal level, a veritable wave of term

6

In Ronald Wright’s study of ten states between 1996 and 2006, he found that sitting
prosecutors won 71% of the general elections. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 592 (2009) [hereinafter Wright, How
Prosecutor Elections Fail Us]. “Because the incumbent sought reelection in only
75% of all general election campaigns, the incumbent success rate when running for
office was 95%.” Id. Even more striking is the lack of opposition at election time.
Over 80% of prosecutor incumbents run unopposed in both general elections and
primaries. Id. at 596 Table 2. Contrast that with state legislative incumbents, who
run unopposed in only 35% of their elections. Id. at 594.
7
“Prosecutor elections fail for two reasons: (1) they do not often force an incumbent
to give any public explanation at all for the priorities and practices of the office and
(2) even when incumbents do face challenges, candidates talk more about particular
past cases than about the larger patterns and values reflected in local criminal
justice.” Id., at 583.
8
As of 2004, one state, Colorado, does have term limits for chief prosecutors, who
can serve no more than two consecutive four-year terms. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor
Elections, supra note 3, at 602 n.37. “As a result, the percentage of re-election races
run by incumbents is 51%, is much lower than the normal 74%.” Id. at 602. One
benefit of turnover that could also affect incarceration rates is diversity. Brooklyn
District Attorney Charles J. Hynes was finally defeated in 2013 after twenty-four
years in office. Hynes was defeated by Kenneth Thompson, a former federal
prosecutor, who became the first African-American district attorney in Brooklyn’s
history. This is no small matter as a recent study showed that about 95 percent of the
2,437 elected state and local prosecutors across the country in 2014 were white, and
79 percent were white men. Nicholas Fandos, A Study Documents the Paucity of
Black Elected Prosecutors: Zero in Most States, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/us/a-study-documents-the-paucity-of-blackelected-prosecutors-zero-in-moststates.html?emc=edit_th_20150707&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=55122800.
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limits legislation swept through the states, especially in the South.9
The term limits wave, however, was focused on state legislators and
eventually state executives, and never made its way down to sheriffs
and chief prosecutors.10 As a result, a single chief prosecutor is able to
stay in office for decades – for an entire generation – without
challengers, and without anyone questioning the policies that cause
more convictions, the Sheriff to call for larger jails, and a bloated and
outsized bureaucracy to hold the machinery together.11 Taxpayers foot
the bill and have no idea what it is.12

9

Since the 1980’s, when the war on drugs combined with the crack epidemic to
create a tidal wave of “tough on crime” legislation, at the same time there was a
wave of “term limits” legislation that spread throughout the country. Term limits
were initially conceived by Republicans to solve what might now be regarded as a
quaint problem – as a way to finally break the stranglehold on the federal Congress
that Democrats had enjoyed since the New Deal in the 1930’s.
10
To the extent the issue has been or would ever be put to voters, they would seem
to support term limits. In 1994, Colorado voters passed a constitutional amendment
expanding term limits to all but judges, and including District Attorneys. In 2002,
the state’s District Attorneys sponsored a referendum to exempt DAs from term
limits, but it lost by 65 to 35 percent margin. The issue was finally settled in 2004
when the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that inclusion of District Attorneys term
limits followed the intent of the voters. In 2001, Nassau County residents voted in
favor of a referendum that no district attorney could serve longer that 12 consecutive
years in office. Unfortunately, the referendum was invalidated by the court, which
held that only the state, and not voters, could determine how long district attorneys,
who were state officials, could remain in office.
11
Using New York City as an example, chief prosecutors can fully expect to stay in
power for decades without opposition if they want. Until Brooklyn District Attorney
Charles Hynes was defeated in a contested election in 2013, after 24 years in office,
1955 was the last year an incumbent district attorney in New York City had been
beaten by an opponent. In Brooklyn, the last time an incumbent prosecutor was
voted out was in 1911. Richard Brown in Queens has been in office since 1991.
Robert Johnson in the Bronx has been the borough’s top prosecutor since 1989.
Robert Morgenthau served as Manhattan district attorney for nearly 35 years before
retiring at age 89. As another example, Harry Connick, Sr. presided as Orleans
Parish District Attorney from 1973 to 2002. Over the course of his career, “he
lobbied against almost any policy that could be perceived as a sign of prosecutorial
‘softness,’ even plea bargaining.” Gwen Filosa, Connick calling it quits, TIMESPICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 2002; see also Gwen Filosa, Harry Bids Adieu, TIMESPICAYUNE, Mar, 28, 2002.
12
See Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (“While district attorneys must
consider the costs of prosecuting crimes – because they largely use county funds in
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As a result, what is left is a senseless political system with
respect to criminal justice priorities. Theoretically, governors, state
legislatures, mayors and city councils, as the elected chief executives
and legislative branches of government ought to be making policy
decisions with respect to criminal justice. These individuals should
also be prioritizing resource allocations so that spending on
prosecuting crime and imprisoning people is placed in proper
perspective and relation to other community needs such as housing,
jobs, education, health, water, or sanitation. But that is not what
actually takes place.
Chief prosecutors and sheriffs, with their electoral clout,
supported by virtually wholly owned vested interests, and with the
ultimate trump card of non-term limited virtual lifetime positions,
exercise vastly disproportionate power to direct inordinate resources
towards prosecuting and punishing crime. Imagine a state with 50 or
60 counties, each with their own locally elected sheriff and chief
prosecutor who has been there for more than a decade, perhaps several
decades.
These longtime sheriffs and chief prosecutors have
organized themselves into statewide sheriffs’ and District Attorneys’
“Associations.”
These associations form powerful lobbies for
legislation. But equally, pity the poor politician running for governor
in such a state with each of these 50 or 60 sheriffs and prosecutors, in
close contact with their local communities after years or decades in
office, against or without the support of these powerful, experienced
political players. It is difficult to find or even imagine a candidate
who could prevail. The same is true for those running for office as
state legislators, mayors and local city councilmembers. As a result,
candidates for “policymaking” offices, such as chief executive or
legislator, are often captive to what ostensibly are, and should be, nonmanaging their offices – they need not overly concern themselves with the costs of
incarceration given that, in the majority of jurisdictions, the prison system operates
via state monies. This ‘split-funding’ of the criminal justice system results in both
the diffusion of the financial burden between the states and local budgets and, in
political terms for prosecutors, the evasion of wholesale blame for the expenditures
required in seeking convictions and procuring severe sentences.”).
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policymaking elected officials in the form of local sheriffs and chief
prosecutors who are benefited and empowered by mass incarceration.
IV. TODAY’S SOLUTION TIES HISTORICAL GOALS TO REALITY
Today, local governments are quite well developed. In contrast
to the first half of the 19th century, most Americans live in urban
areas, not rural. Cities and towns have developed local government
structures, similar to the federal and state models, with a chief
executive, usually a mayor, and a legislative branch such as a city or
town council. The same is true at the county level with the
development of county presidents and county boards. Accordingly, in
today’s day and age, it is no longer true that the only practical option
for imparting or maintaining local control over chief prosecutors’
offices and sheriffs’ departments is the local election.
Unlike the early 19th century, it is now perfectly plausible and
practical to have local chief prosecutors and local sheriffs appointed in
the same manner as almost all high federal government officials and
many high state level officials – appointment by the local chief
executive (be it city mayor or county president) with advice and
consent of a local legislative body (be it city or town council or county
board). This would be a better compromise between the appointment
system at the remote state level of governor or state legislature that
initially existed at the start of the 19th century, and the local election
system that we now have. The local election system has led us down
the path of incarceration as a solution to many problems, such as
mental health, substance abuse, lack of jobs, education, and poverty,
resulting in our current system of mass incarceration.
Appointing sheriffs and chief prosecutors would have a
number of salutary effects. First, it would place what should be nonpolicymaking positions under the control and authority of those who
rightfully ought to be elected – those in policymaking positions such
as the chief executives and legislators. In this way, the position of
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sheriff and chief prosecutor would be charged with carrying out the
policies of the elected policymakers, which is as it should be.
Second, appointing sheriffs and chief prosecutors would more
likely ensure that the priority ranking of prosecution and punishment
within the broad array of services the government is expected to
deliver is aligned with that of the elected policymakers, and therefore
more closely aligned with the wishes and priorities of the electorate,
and more responsive to it. It is much easier and more likely for a chief
executive such as a mayor, or a legislator such as a city
councilmember, to be voted out of office than a sheriff or chief
prosecutor. And in an appointment system, voting out the appointer
ends the appointment. Additionally, the existence of term limits for
the chief executive ensures that sheriffs and chief prosecutors, with
their virtually unchecked authority within their sphere, would not be in
place for decades, as is now the case, with the attendant
aggrandizement of power over time. Finally, appointing chief
prosecutors and sheriffs would place the positions one step removed
from direct electoral politics. This would significantly reduce the ill
effects of vested interests such as employees, their family and friends
and the letting of contracts.
All of the above would lead to less emphasis and resources on
incarceration as a solution to societal problems, and put the
prosecution of crime and its punishment more in its proper perspective
and balance with other community needs and alternative solutions. It
will also significantly reduce the entrenched political opposition to
ending mass incarceration that impedes reform. There are those who
say a return to appointments is politically infeasible.13 To the contrary,
just as elections swept in to replace appointments in the hope of
increased democracy and local control, an informed citizenry today
would see that democracy and local control requires taking those
outsized political offices and placing them back into the hands of the
properly responsive elected official, and this time a truly local one.
13

Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, supra note 3; Medwed, supra note 12.

